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1 . SUMMARY: Petr school board negotiated to a 
deadlock with resp teachers over a contract. The teachers 
struck. After notice and an opportunity for a hearing, 
the school board fired the teachers for illegally striking. 
The Wis~onsi~~C (Beilfuss) held that in these circumstances 
due process principles required the imposition of a de novo 
r eview of the school board's decision to fire the teachers , 
because the school board lacked the impartiality necessary 
t o make a final discharge decision, and held that resps could 
----
have a de novo review of the school board decision in state 
court. -.- ..., The school board's petition for certiorari questions 
the soundness of this due process conclusion. On a cross-
petition for cert conditioned upon granting of the school board's 
petition, the teachers question the constitutional propriety of 
discharge effective before de novo review is exercised, an issue 
not discussed by the Wisconsin SC, and claim entitlement to 
immediate reinstatement and back pay. There is an additional 
issue of the finality of the Wisconsin SC decree. 
r- ' ,___ ~ _, .-,.,.-. ----------
2. FACTS: In January 1974, petitioners, school and 
school board officials in the Hortonville Joint School District 
were engaged in contract negotiations with respondents, teachers, 
in the Hortonville schools and their bargaining agent, the 
Hortonville Education Association. The negotiations fell through, 
and a substantial number of the teachers later struck. After 
the initiation of the strike, the school superintendent, at the 
direction of the Board, sent letters to the teachers inviting 








their return to work. A second letter, further advising 
that strikes by public employees were illegal and that the 
Board would not condone illegality by its employees, was 
sent a few days later. Approximately a week later, following 
a Board decision to conduct individual discharge hearings, 
- ------------- ' - - • 
notices of the hearings were sent to the striking teachers . 
The teachers appeared mostly together before the Board (with 
their counsel), ·indicating their preference to be treated as 
a group, and raising objections to their notice, and the 
impartiality of the Board as a decision-maker. Substantively , 
they asserted that the Board had provoked the strike; but they 
were denied any opportunity to examine the Board members to 
establish their substantive point. At a subsequent special 
-✓ meeting, the Board determined to terminate the contracts of 
the striking teachers on the ground that the teachers had 
breached their contracts and engaged in a strike in violation 
of Wisconsin law • . The teachers were so notified. The Board 
afterward began to hire replacement teachers. 
The respondent teachers then brought this class action 
1/ 
in the state circuit court alleging, inter alia, - that the 
circumstances of their hearing and discharge deprived them of 
property without due process and violated the state open meeting 
law. They prayed for a declaration that the Board's action was 
null and void, an order that the discharge of the teachers be 
1/ 






set aside, an injunction against hiring additional 
r eplacements, and that the replacements' contracts be 
r escinded, and an order requiring the parties to select 
an impartial decision-maker to review whether there was 
j ust cause for the discharge, and such other relief as 
would be appropriate . 
The Wisconsin Circuit Court (Deehr) held that the 
meeting law was not violated, and that while the respondents 
were entitled to due process, they had received it, and 
entered summary judgment for petrs. 
~nan expedited appeal , the Wis consin SC permitted 
the teachers to raise all constitutional issues , whether 
presented below or not. The Wisconsin SC held that the 
../ 
teachers' strike was unlawful under state law and that the 
Board did have the power to dismiss the teachers. It held 
iiE' e._a......,~ ... ::w.s -- • ,,____,.,, ----- ---
f urt her that the dismissed teachers were not denied equal 
protection through selective enforcement of the Board's right 
to discharge them in response to their strike. It further 
held that there was no denial of equal protection in the 
legislature's denial of the right to strike to municipal 
employees because (1) the private marketplace pressures of 
competition involved in ordinary collective bargaining are 
absent in the governmental sphere, rendering a governmental 
employer particularly vulnerable to strikes; (2) public 
employees have legislative recourse; and (3) the strike ban 
protects public health, safety and welfare. Answering the 
. • 
-




related argument that teachers were illegally discriminated 
against vis a vis firemen and policemen who were granted 
other benefits, such as binding arbitration in exchange for 
denial of the right to strike, the Wisconsin SC reasoned: 
"It is not difficult to find a rational 
basis for the legislation. If police 
or firemen go on strike the imminent 
and immediate danger to the community 
is so great that every reasonable 
measure must be taken to get them back 
on the job as soon as possible, or to 
prevent them from striking in the first 
instance. The classification is not 
unreasonable and is a legitimate exercise 
of the legislative function." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Respondents contended that their dismissal hearing 
failed to comport with due process for the sole reason that 
they were ~ied an impartial decision-~er. Relying on 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; and Perry v. Sinderman, 
408 U.S. 593, the Wisconsin SC located a property right in the 
teacher's employment contracts for the current year and offers 
or contracts of employment for the next term. The Board argued 
that by going ·on strike the teachers abandoned their property 
interest in continued employment. The Wisconsin SC disagreed 
with the analysis on three bases, however. Firs½ the due 
' 
-- -- ~--------- -process hearing would ordinarily be necessary to determine 
whether, on the facts, the strike had occurred. Second, while 
~ ,~~ 1 it said that it need not reach the merits of the question, Ct"\°'"~ l • ~T ~ 
S!W'ie. ~~~~~I because of its first answer, the Wisconsin SC observed that 
A W~l\V\ ~c.-
~~ ~~ I dismissal on account of a strike was not automatic under - _______________  
... 






Wisconsin law, rather other course, of action were open 
? to the Board, which may have been more reasonable in the . 
,./ 
circumstances, and, relying on MorrisS=y v. Brewer's re-
quirement that issues in mitigation be heard at a parole 
revocation hearing, 408 U.S. 471, 487, held that: 
"it would seem essential, even in cases 
of undisputed or stipulated facts, that 
an impartial decision-maker be charged 
with the responsibility of determining 
what action shall be taken on the basis 
of those facts." 
Third, the Wisconsin SC rejected the plurality approach in 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, as expressly tied to the 
Lloyd-LaFollette Act, and not "analogous." Finally, the 
II '-
Wisconsin SC also identified a Roth reputation-based liberty 
interest of the teachers which could be infringed by termination 
on grounds of breach of contract and unlawful striking. 
Turning to the merits of respondents' argument that the 
Board's negotiating role deprived it of impartiality in making ....---____ _ 
the discharge decision, the Wisconsin SC relied upon pecuniary 
interest cases, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564; Ward 
v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57; and other cases in-
volving the impartiality of an administrative decision-maker, 
~.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, to 
hold the Board incompetent as a final decision-maker here: 
............ ,,_.,,,,,.....___... aw,..,.,_,, aw,.a ,,,_., .. 
"It is not difficult to imagine the 
frustration on the part of the board 
members when negotiations broke down, 
agreement could not be reached and 
the employees resorted to concerted 
. .. 
-









activity. This is not to suggest, 
of course, that the board members 
were anything but dedicated public 
servants, trying to provide the 
district with quality education 
while still keeping within its 
limited budget. They were, however, 
not uninvolved in the events which 
precipitated decisions they were 
required to make. The decision to 
discharge was possibly a convenient 
alternative which would eliminate 
their labor problems in one fell 
swoop. We conclude that the board 
was not an im.ruirt,J.al deci,sion-maker 
in a constitutional sense and that 
the appellants were denied due 
process of law." 
The Wisconsin SC then rejected existing and available 
t 2/ 
post-termination review procedures - as sufficient to remedy 
the due process insufficiency of a hearing before the Board, 
because 
"[n]either of the alternatives 
provided for review to determine when 
another course of action ..• would 
have been a more reasonable response 
on the part of the decision-maker. 
I 
In light of that fact, it is difficult 
to see how either review can replace 
an impartial decision-maker in the 
first instance." 
Recognizing the need for swift action on the part of 
the school board in staffing the schools with teachers (so 
as not to lose state aid), and that under sta t e law nobody 
other than the Board was authorized to hire or fire teachers, 
the Wisconsin SC held that the School Board "should make the 
2/ 
- They are (1) review by common-law writ of certiorari; (2) 
by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. 
revie, 
. (' 







initial determination as to the hiring or firing [upon 
notice and hearing] of one or many teachers." The Wisconsin 
SC then provided that in those situations where a final 
decision by the Board does not in itself provide due process, 
because of the Board's "adversary position," a dissatisfied 
t eacher could ''obtain a de novo determination of all issues 
i n any court of record in the county • . •• The court shall -r esolve any factual disputes and provide for a reasonable 
disposition." Although recognizing that its remedy was "not 
i deal because a court may be required to make public policy 
decisions that are better left to a legislative or admin-
i strative body," the Wisconsin SC found its remedy required 
until the legislature fashioned some alternative . Pursuant 
_,, t o this conclusion, the Wisconsin SC reversed the summary 
j udgment below in favor of the Board, and remanded the case 
with permission for the parties to amend their pleadings so as 
t o frame the necessary issues. 
-- --- ------------------
Finally, the Wisconsin SC held the Wisconsin open 
meeting law not violated. 
Justices Hanson (concurring and joining Hanley) and 
Hanley (concurring in part and dissenting in part) filed separate 
opinions considering the case solely as a contractural dispute 
under state law, without any discussion of the due process issues 
Cross petitions for rehearing were denied. 
. , 







3. No. 74-1616 -- School Board Petition for Cert. 
A. Jurisdiction. The question is whether there 
is a final order from the Wisconsin SC, since the case re-
mains to be tried by the Wisconsin courts, determining~ !!QYQ. 
whether the discharge was reasonable. Neither side cites Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, U.S. ---' 43 USLW 4343. Without 
extended discussion, except to argue that a reversal on the 
due process issue here will avoid a long complex and pointless -trial, the petrs rely upon Hudson Distributors v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 377 U.S. 386, 389 n. 4; Construction Laborers Local v. 
Curry, 371 U.S. 540; and Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau. 
Vigorously arguing that there is no final decree, resps dis-
tinguis h the case from Curry, on the ground that Curry involved 
/ a juris dictional question. Resps also point out that petrs may 
yet win at trial by proof under state law of the propriety of 
3/ 
its dis charge decision. -
3/ 
- Resps do not mention in this argument that they originally 
alleged two causes of action not ruled upon by the Wisconsin 
SC: (1) an unelaborated equal protection claim based on the 
alleged difference in treatment accorded teachers depending 
upon whether they were or were not represented by the Horton-
ville Education Association; and (2) an unspecified claim re-
garding hiring replacement teachers. These are only mentioned 
in the statement of the case in the conditional cross-petition. 
These two other causes of action were demurred to, and the 
demurrers were sustained. But, according to the statement of 
the case, they have been re-pled and now pend before the state 
trial court. It is not evident whether these claims are en-
meshed in the due process contentions or request the same relief 









Of the four categories of exceptions to the finality 
rule's general requirement of awaiting the completion of 
additional proceedings anticipated in the lower state courts, 
the case here most closely relates to the fourth: 
"Where the federal issue has been 
finally decided in the state courts 
with further proceedings pending 
in which the party seeking review 
here might prevail on the merits on 
nonfederal grounds, thus rendering 
unnecessary review of the federal 
issues by this Court, and where 
reversal of the state court on the 
federal issue would be preclusive of 
any further litigation on the relevant 
cause of action rather than merely 
controlling the nature and character 
of, or determining the admissibility 
of evidence in, the state proceedings 
still to come." 
But the Cox Broadcasting Court's opinion only recognizes this 
exception as existing in cases where: 
"a refusal immediately to review the 
state court decision might seriously 
erode federal policy." 
The three cases relied upon by petrs are all found to come 
within both requirements of category four. But the present 
case does not satisfy the second criterion, in the sense that 
the federal constitutional claim was vindicated in the Wisconsin 
SC op~Q:i.,pn. This case is essentially the obverse; petitioners 
/ -----------------here complain that the erosion of state policy (in having 
political decisions unreviewed) by the arguably erroneous 
decision which no federal policy supports. Analogously to Cox 
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Wisconsin SC decision would remain even if they succeeded 
at trial. Moreover, it might be argued that the interest 
in minimizing state-federal friction would in fact be 
enhanced by immediate review in this case, to relieve the 
state of unwarranted federal bindings, especially where no 
independent state law question could resolve the case in 
favor of the petitioners here. That is, this is not a case 
where at trial petrs may cumulate state and federal law 
defenses, and may yet win on the state points which im-
properly denied a federal defense; rather this is a case where 
the affirmative existence of the plaintiffs' case rests upon 
an assertedly erroneous view of federal law. While Cox 
Broadcasting does not rule out the existence of other pragmatic 
categories of cases in which a judgment directing a trial will 
nevertheless be considered final, it does not recognize cases 
of this sort to be finally adjudged. Moreover, such a rule as 
would admit this case to finality would inevitably invite an 
additional throng, in some of which the precise compass of the 
c:::: -
federal basis of the plaintiff's action, as held by the state 
court, may not be confidently measurable until it is seen in 
operation upon remand. 
B. Contentions on Merits. Petrs contend that their 
action afforded all process due respondents under Withrow v. 
Larkin, __ U.S. __ , 43 USLW 4459; and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U.S. 134. They stress that the Wisconsin SC conclusion was not 









a strike's existence was uncontested. Relying on Arnett, 
t hey stress the public interest in having the school 
board make the discharge decision -- that, it is said, is 
precisely their function in reconciling economic and edu-
cational goals. In this regard, they note that Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, did not require that a parole revocation 
decision-maker be a judicial officer or lawyer. The Board 
analogizes to Withrow, arguing that the only basis for alleging 
bias is that the Board must take into account its non-judicatory 
statutory obligations. They contend that under the holding 
here a top-level decision-maker is denied the rights of a private 
employer to discharge on the basis of cause which involves the 
decision-maker. They also argue that for due process purposes 
•✓ a striker in these circumstances should be regarded as having 
4/ 
abandoned his property interest. 
Respondents contend that the Wisconsin SC decision is 
fully consistent with the requirements of uninvolved decision-
maker review in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, and Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471. They stress that the Wisconsin SC held 
as a state law matter that discharge was not an automatic response 
to a strike, and generally rely on the opinion below and cases in 
4 / C::.O V\ f' \I C. 't 
- Resps also argue Awith, ~, Bullock v. Munford, CA D.C. 1974, 
509 F.2d 384; Shirck v. Thomas, CA 7, 1971, 447 F.2d 1025, 1028; 
Sanford v. Rockefeller, 1974, N.Y. __ , 88 LRRM 2189, appeal 











this Court recognizing the psychological threats to impartial 
decision-making necessarily in question when the decision-
maker's own adversary experience is involved in the case. See 
generally Morrissey v. Brewer; Pickering v. Board of Education, 
391 U.S. 563, 578 n. 2; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133. See also 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455. Analogizing to Withrow, 
they argue that the School Board would have had to have taken 
psychologically self-contradictory action if it had in effect 
accepted partial "blame" for the strike by administering less 
than the strongest "punishment" -- discharge -- against the 
striking teachers. Following the Wisconsin SC, they distinguish 
Arnett v. Kennedy as based upon the Lloyd-Lafollette Act's limitec 
grant of a property right -- as compared with the property right 
unconditioned by procedural review provisions as found by the 
Wisconsin SC here as a matter of state law -- and because of the 
post-termination hearing afforded in Arnett. Respondents also 
argue that the Wisconsin SC's "insights into local laws and local 
realities" in this case should be respected. 
C. Discussion of Merits. Taking as uncontested the 
fact of the strike, if dismissal were automatic, it seems 
difficult to accept the argument that the Board was incompetent 
~ 
inally ~ ny ;respondents of their property and liberty through 
discharge. But accepting the Wisconsin SC's conclusion that 
discipline through dismissal was not automatic, the argument has 
-considerable thrust. The central problem faced here, of in-








executive review is unavailable under state law, has not 
been resolved by this Court in Arnett or elsewhere. See 
generally Arnett, 416 U.S. 134, 155 n. 21 (REHNQUIST, J.); 
170 n. 5 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); 196 (WHITE, J. , 
c oncurring and dissenting); 205 (OOUGLAS, J., dissenting); 
217 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The Wisconsin SC result 
r enders top-level negotiation and decision-making seriously - -- - -- ,,,,..... ----:wa 
threatfil).ed. Essentially the thrust of the Wisconsin SC 
decision is to appoint a new decision-maker who must . ratify 
any discharge decision under these circumstances. Significantly , ~--
the only new decision-maker available is a court: in a case like 
this the legislature will not have set up a fall-back agency in 
advance. Left hanging are questions like what would happen if 
/ another court in the position of the Wisconsin SC had no au-
t hority to invest the equivalent of the lower Wisconsin courts 
with responsibility for these matters, or how the body in the 
S\-i\\) 'M.~°'w-t ~4~'\' 
~ ~'"' -+1Ae Wi.s. 
S-<=lr. o. \U' -\-cy. 
""\~" :I ~~" 
~ W6"'-l,l ~ 
>~~~) 
-l . / 
position of the Wisconsin courts are to develop a law of 
r easonableness in exercising their de novo review. The petition 
for cert should be granted, if jurisdiction exists. Petrs rely 
strongly on Withrow v. Larkin, but respondents do as well, and 
it is unlikely that a summary remand for its consideration would 
resolve this case. 
Resps 
4. No. 74-1638 -- Teachers' Conditional Cross-Petition 
for Cert. 
A. Equal Protection Claims, Contentions & Discussion. 
conditional cross-petrs -- say that they are denied 









striking, and which while providing that policemen and 
firemen (like teachers) may not strike, also provide that 
policemen and firemen (unlike teachers) are entitled to 
binding arbitration and de novo judicial review of the 
reasonableness of disciplinary proceedings against them. 
In response, the Board relies upon the Wisconsin SC opinionj 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471; and Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483. There is nothing certworthy here. 
B. Due Process Claim, Contentions & Discussion. 
Cross petrs say they are immediately entitled to resinstatement 
with back pay pending de novo review of their dismissal, because 
they were entitled a full due process hearing before a non-
biased decision-maker prior to any effective termination. They 
✓' rely generally on Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123; 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471; Goss v. Lopez, U.S. 
___ , 43 USLW 4181; North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di Chem, Inc. 
U.S. 43 USLW 4192. They assert that no Board interest 
in expedition militates to the contrary because if in need of 
swift resumption of school classes, the Board could have sought 
injunctive relief against the strike. Somewhat unclearly they 
assert that a redetermination of the propriety of discharge as 
ordered by the Wisconsin SC could be truly de novo only if they 
were in office pending that determination. 
In response, the Board repeats its argument that Wisconsin 




• ;/ - • 
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require a de novo determination of the reasonableness of 
discharge. The Board asserts tbat - the cross petrs ' arg,,mell.t 
i s inconsistent with the Wisconsin SC holding 's recognition 
of some initial discharge decision-making role for the Board. 
They further argue that on the facts the teachers were not 
✓ being paid because they were on strike, and that they "were 
not terminated after they returned to work" or discharged fo r 
punishment. They also argue that on the facts there were no 
mitigating circumstances here, such as were envisioned in 
Morrissey v. Brewer. The Board repeats the assertion that the 
discharge decision is a particularly political one, and that 
Board members alone are subject to reelection. Finally, it 
contends that a balance struck beteen the need for quick action 
,~• i n providing classroom teachers outweighs any striking teachers' 
5/ 
r ights to immediate protection of their property interests. -
It is not clear whether this issue was 
adequately preserved, though the Board does not make any argument 
r~• c..,ossj>e+H-itM 
~ / ~ dot.> ~~ert I on this . The Wisconsin courts never mentioned back pay; and 
~ 
~ ~ fCM~~-+e-
..... .-, ~- d 
cross petrs do not recite any pleading or argument of the issues 
~ ~ - ~'/ 
.U\#.t-~ v.ie..re '' ~ •l~ I in the trial court. 
~ ~M -~i~ 1 B d · · · · · 1 d · · · h. h . . t b. 
Cross petrs may argue that the likelihood of 
~ ~ CMl\n oar error 1.n 1.ts 1.n1.t1.a ec1.s1.on 1.s 1.g , given 1. s 1.as, so 
.c..+. ~ C\ff~lt I that even if a full hearing might be postponed until following a 
~~ W 'le~•"'"'.)•~ determination 
•~3,~, '"""' .... ~ 1 necessarily fast termination decision, initial/ by the Board 
__. \llh. So ,e:.t-, o.\\l)~ 
~\ ~~.;....-\-\Oil'\~\ is insufficient as a preliminary stage. Neither of these questio1 
1 s s~, s -\0 ~e '("'~,.sel) 
. ¥!~(/( w/r' --------
~ ~~c~w:' 51The Board cites Rockwell v. Bd. of Education of School District 
""-~~ u~•• of Crestwood, 1975, 393 Mich 616, holding post-termination hear-
ings for school teachers discharged for striking to be sufficient 
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has been resolved in Arnett or elsewhere. s_~, e.g., 
opinion of MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, 416 U.S., at 155 n. 21. 
While Sanford v. Rockefeller, N.Y. ---' 88 LRRM 2189, 
raising the due process sufficiency of a post-penalty full 
hearing was DFWSFQ ., __ U.S._, 43 USLW 3613 (DOUGLAS, 
WHITE & MARSHALL, JJ., dissenting), that case involved neither 
a bias claim on the part of the pre-hearing decision order nor 
actual discharge (only probationary status). Cf. also Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 486, 488 (impartial decision order re-
quired at preliminary stage even though the Court did not require 
attention to or arguments in investigation at that stage). In 
this case, the delay before a de novo hearing is quite long owing 
to the fact that there was no de novo hearing until the Wisconsin ---
SC said so, but that uniqueness itself discourages certiorari 
review, and in future cases under the Wisconsin SC holding the 
initiative will be with the teacher. Most significantly, 
however, the mesh of this issue with the due process analysis of 
the whole case counsels in favor of granting the conditional 
cross petition, limited to the back pay and reinstatement issue, 
if the Board's petition is granted. Similar issues are raised 
in Nos. 74-204, Weinberger v. Eldridge, and 74-205, Weinberger v. 
Williams (pre-oral hearing termination of disability benefits); 
and see Nos. 74-858, Carey v. Sugar; 74-859, Curtis Publ. Co. v. 
Sugar; 73-1808, Laing v. United States; 74-75, United States v. 
Hall (raising Fuentes/Mitchell/North Georgia Finishing issues), 






·t · - -
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C. Jurisdiction. Cross petrs contend that 
j urisdiction to entertain their conditional cross petition 
under§ 1257(3) exists if jurisdiction to entertain the 
Board's petition exists. They cite Farmers Reservoir & 
I rrigation Co. v. McComb, 335 U.S. 809, 337 U.S. 755, in 
support of the proprie ty of a cross petition conditioned upon 
t he granting of the adversary's petition. The case report notes 
only that cross petitions were granted; thus Stern & Gressman, 
at 311 n. 78, revealing that the cross petition was explicitly 
conditional, is evidently the real authority. Neither con-
tention is disputed by cross respondent. The conditional 
corss petn seems unobjectionable. Finality of the judgment on 
the lack of immediate reinstatement and back pay is established 
' 
/ by Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541. 
Jurisdiction to entertain the equal protection claim on the 
conditional cross petition would follow from an assertion of 
jurisdiction over the Board's petition, if only because a 
decision in favor of the Board on the due process claim renders 
the state judgment against equal protection claims clearly final. 
There is a 
8/14/75 
response to each petition. 
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process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. While the 
analysis of the Wisconsin SC explicitly depends upon this 
1/ 
Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, - the 
respondents did argue that they were denied due process 
under Wisc. Const. § 1, App., at 6, and the Wisconsin SC did 
cite two Wisconsin cases for the general proposition that 
2/ 
fair play is a factor in due process, App., at 23. - Moreover, 
the Wisconsin SC explicitly relies upon Wisc. Const. Art. 1, 
3/ 
§ 13, - as its authority in providing the respondents the 
remedy it fashioned. App., at 27. 
1/ 
- The opinion of the Wisconsin SC also recites that the 
Fourteenth Amendment only proscribes state action denying due 
process, and states that "[b]efore it can be determined whether 
., the appellants were denied due process, it must be established 
that they were entitled to due process of law in that they were 
deprived of their property or liberty by state action." (Emphasis 
added.) App., at 16. 
2/ 
- One of these cases relies in turn upon state as well as federal 
notions of due process. 
3/ 
"Every person is entitled to a 
certain remedy in the laws for all 
injuries, or wrongs which he may 
receive in his person, property, 
or character; he ought to obtain 
justice freely, and without being 
obliged to purchase it, completely 
and without denial, promptly and 










MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion in denying the 
stay states that he would conclude that the judgment of 










SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A- 133 (74-1606) 
Hortonville Joint School District 
No. 1 et al. , Petitioners, 
V. 
Hortonville Education Associa-
tion et al. 
On Application for 
Stay. 
[August 18, 1975] 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, Circuit Justice. 
,(' 
If the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
were plainly a "final judgment" for purposes of 28-
U. S. C. § 1257, and if it plainly rested solely upon a 
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution , I would be inclined to gra.nt the 
stay requested by the applicant School Board. I think 
that none of our cases require the conclusion, reached 
by the Wisconsin court, that a school board may not be 
allowed to dismiss teachers which it employs because it 
is not the sort of impartial decisionmaker required by 
due process of la·w. If this matter were before me on 
the petition for certiorari where I would be casting my 
vote as a Member of the Court, I would conclude that I 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ~d 
rest solely upon the Fourteenth Amendment. But in 
my capacity as Circuit Justice, where I act "as a surro-
gate for the entire Court," Holtzrnan v. Schlesinger, 414-
U. S. 1304, 1313 (H)73) (MARSHALL, J., in chambers). 
doubts as to whether the judgment may not rest also· 
upon a construction of the Wisconsin Constitution, and 
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ALLEN L. SAMSON 
COURT COMMI SSIONER 
THOMAS W, ST. JOH N 
D , JEFFREY HIRSCHBERG 
CHARLES D,CLAUSEN 
-
FRIEBERT & FINERTY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
710 NORTH P LANKI NTON A VENUE 
MILWAUKEE,WISCONSIN 53203 
TELEPHONE (4141 271-0130 
January 16, 1976 
.Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr. 
Clerk 
United States Supreme Court 
One First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
-
Re: Hortonville Joint School District No. 1, et al 
v. Hortonville Education Association, et al 
October Term, 1975 
Case No. 74-1606 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
lullreme Court. U. S. 
FILED 
JAN 19 1976 
MICRAR RODAK, .IR.,ClERK 
!.. 
OF' COUN S EL 
HARR Y E. SAMSON 
HAROLD NASH 
COURT COMMISSIONER 
When the Brief for respondents was filed in the above captioned 
case, reference was made to two Wisconsin decisions which were 
in slip sheet form at that time. Since then, those cases have 
been printed in both official and unofficial reports. The 
cases and the citations are as follows: 
Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 v. Kenosha 
Education Association, 70 Wis. 2d 325, 234 N.W. 
2d 311 (1975) 
Joint School District No. 1, City of Wisconsin Rapids, 
et al v. Wisconsin Rapids Education Association, et al 
70 Wis. 2d 292, 234 N.W. 2d 289 (1975) 
This information is submitted for the convenience of the Court 
and opposing counsel. 
TWS:jln 
cc: Jack Walker 
Robert M. Weinberg 
Very truly yours, 
FRIEBERT & FINERTY 
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ROBERT I. BOEHM 
LOREN B . Si EGEL 
33 NO RTH L A SALLE STREET 
CHICAGO, l LLI NOIS 60602 
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January 17, 1976 
The Chief Justice and Associat e 
Justices o f the Supreme Court 
of the Unit ed States 
Supreme Court Building 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: Lawrence Cantor d/b/a Selden Drugs 
Company , individually and on behalf of 
all other retail sellers of light bulbs 
s imilarly situated, Pe titioner v. The 
De troit Edison Company , a New York 
c orpora_ti~n, Responde nt No. 75-1 22 
My Dear Chief Justice and Associate Justices: 
At the conclusion of my rebuttal argument on Wedne sday, 
January 14, 1976, the Court inquired as to whether there is 
any record evide nce that there are other ele6tric utilities 
in Michigan which had a ligh t bulb program s imilar to that 
used by The De troit Edison Company. I answered the ques tion 
"no". I may have misconstrued the Court's ques tion . Regardless , 
there is evidence in the record that, with the exception of 
a municipally owned utility in Lan s ing , Michiga n , no o the r 
utility in Michigan or the United States has suc h a program. 
Appendix 162A. 
BIW/hrw 
cc: Mr. Howard J. Trienens 
Mr. Paul Rodgers 
Mr. Rober t H. Bork 
Mr. George D. Reycraft 
Mr. Leon S . Cohan 
Ve ry truly yours , 
,t:! ,,../ J' I /.. ./--1 }tc-2,{_,,t:J(. ff/fl'h1,1,J(l1c-:<--








Mr. Justice Powell 
Greg Palm 
DATE: February 23, 1976 
No. 74-1606 Hortonville Joint School District 
No. 1. v. Hortonville Education 
Association 
I recommend that the decision below be affirmed. This 
recommendation turns in significant part on my understanding 
of Wisconsin law in the area of public teacher bargaining 
rights. 
It is my current understanding that under Wisdonsin law 
although a teacher may be fired for engaging in a strike, this 
must be the most reasonable course of action under all the 
circumstances. Significantly, one of the circumstances that 
must be considered in making that assessment is whether the 
school board has engaged in good faith bargaining. If this 
understanding is correct then I do not believe that the board 
constitutes a suffi ciently "neutral" decisionrnaker so as not 
to require de novo review by some other State authority. The 
~ 
~) 
~~ board realistically cannot be expected to consider its own 
~-~~ bargaining efforts as other than in good faith. Moreover, 
~ / a J though the school board members do not possess any personal v.~ pecuniary interest in the outcome of the decision, compare 
- school 
564 (1974), they obviously do 
financial integrity of the 
in increased salaries 








- - 2. 
apparently one of the teacher demands that led to the impasse 
in the contract negotiations here was a demand 
for reduced class size, an outcome that would result in an 
increased financial burden on the district. The principle 
underlying this Court's decision in Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) is s:;;;:rtive of the view ~ 
that this type of financial interest makes the board an ~~ 
unacceptable decisionmaker, in the context of the strike/ 
action decision. In Ward the Court concluded the town mayor 
was unacceptable as the adjudicator of guilt and assessor 
of fines in the local court because of the town's need for 
the revenues derived from such fines . Ward is not controlling 
here, however, sinea (l) the linkage between the fines and the 
revenues is more direct than that between the veiled threat 
of being fired and the strengthening of the board's bargaining 
position; (2) there was some personal pecuniary interest in 
Ward since the mayor's salary presumably was at least indirectly 
tied to the fines levied (it is in part dependent on the 
financial well being of the community); and (3) there is an 
~~~~,'b\~ difference between adjudications of guilt or innocence -----.......-----------------------
even in the case of minor traffic offenses, and the situation 
here - the individual's interest in the former situation is 
1t 
greater than in the latter, and this is an important factor 
in determining what process is due (including the degree of 
neutrality of the decisionmaker). Still, even though Ward ~no+ 
'ce. . controlling, I do think that the financial interest here 
\>O'"'°" is cl.e."-+a.\o\e> 'w\~we.A>e..r.> s,"'c.c V'f\~ uJ~ b4tl,~ \~ ~ o. 5,\o \S 
o'f'C!. sw-iOV\.S ~ be.in«3 ~~ ':)\M"', a-f o. ~c. v,o'-4~~ - "t-1\b~ 
~ \~ 0.. .. \,\tu+y"' '""~s\- ~ -\.o -t\,-o e..to~ • ~~ ~  l: c\O~ 




- - 3. 
coupled with the fact that the board must weigh its own 
conduct (as well as that of the teachers) in assessing which 
alternative sanction - i.e. firing, suspension, fines - is 
most appropriate makes the board ~sufficiently neutral for 
purpose of due process. See Ward, supra, at 60 ("Possible 
temptation to average man"). 
At oral argument I think that it is very important that 
questions be directed to both parties as to Wisconsin law 
concerning the right to fire in the strike situation. The 
opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is not clear on this. 
Respondents' brief asserts rather clearly that state law is 
that firing is not automatic, but can only occur if it is the 
most reasonable course of action under the circumstances. 
Respondents do not, however, cite any cases that directly ----- .......___ - -- -
and clearly support their assertions . For their part the -- --petitioners never really challenge the truth of respondents' 
assertions on this score making me suspect that the assertions 
must in significant measure be true. (There is some language 
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion that might lead one to 
believe that the court derived the reasonable course of action 
requirement from the due process clause.i'- See Petition for 
Certiorari A 24. This is not clear, however, and the opinion 
does cite some State cases at that point, which may/may not 
(cases not currently in library) themselves turn on "federal" 
due process principles.) 
fir \+ -4~, i~ so) ~U\ ,e.u«s...\ , .. Coff'Nf~; ~e w\c¼ c~~ 






- - 4. 
I have no doubt that the Court will split heatedly on 
this issue and that a majority of Justices (including yourself) 
are likely leaning toward reversal. (There are not many cases 
in the area and the judgment as to who constitutes a sufficiently 
neutral decisionmaker for purposes of a particular decision 
is in significant part subjective). Moreover, I am not 
the 
unsympathetic to/view that most decisions regarding educational 
affairs should be left in the hands of the school administrators, 
as the elected or appointed spokesmen of the people. But I 
do not believe that a carefully written opinion in this case 
will in any way affect the ability of school boards (or state 
administrators in other contexts) to make decisions regarding 
the fate of individual employees.* Given the peculiar (I think) 
~
state of Wisconsin law, it may also be possible to limit the 
opinion so as not to control similar cases arising in states 
where firing is the automatic penalty for ~,~<~ (this will 
require effort, however, since it is not entirely easy to 
articulate precisely why the relative simplicity of that 
1~ determination should affect the need for a different 
d . . k ) * .f ec1.s1.onma er. 
G.P. 
ss 
*For example, nothing that is said in this opinion should 
... l.~~ affect the ability of the school board to make decisions 
l}J'VV'1 , regarding the retention/firing of a particular teacher because 
of their view regarding his fitness for the position. He would, 
of course, have the right to challenge the action if based 
on improper grounds . 
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ciation et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin. 
[May - , 1976] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court, 
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether 
school board members, vested by state law with the 
power to employ and dismiss teachers, could, consistent 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-· 
ment, dismiss teachers engaged in a strike prohibited by 
state law. 
I 
The petitioners are a Wisconsin school district, the 
seven members of its school board, and three administra-
tive employees of the district. Respondents are teachers 
suing on behalf of all teachers in the district and the-
Hortonville Education Association (HEA), the collective-
bargaining agent for the district's teachers. 
During the 1972-1973 school year Hortonville teachers 
worked under a master collective-bargaining agreement; 
negotiations were conducted for renewal of the contract, 
but no agreement was reached for the 1973-1974 school 
year. The teachers continued to work while negotiations 




2 HORTONVILLE DIST v. HORTONVILLE ED. ASSN. 
On March 18, 1974, the members of the teachers' union 
went on strike, in direct vi~latiop of Wisconsin law. On 
March 20, the district superintehdent sent all teachers 
a letter inviting them to return to work; a few did so. 
On March 23, he sent another letter, asking the 86 teach-
ers still on strike to return, and reminding them that 
strikes by public employees were illegal; none of these 
teachers returned to work. After conducting classes. with 
substitute teachers on March 26 and 27, the Board de-
cided to conduct disciplinary hearings for each of the 
teachers on strike. Individual notices were sent to each 
teacher setting hearings for April 1, 2, and 3. 
On April 1, most of the striking teachers appeared . 
before the Board with counsel. Their attorney indicated 
that the striking teachers did not want individual hear-
ings, but preferred to be treated as a group. Although 
counsel agreed that the teachers were on strike, he 
raised several procedural objections to the hearings. He 
also argued that the Board was not sufficiently impartial 
to exercise discipline over the striking teachers and that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
required an independtmt, unbiased decisionmaker. An 
off er of proof was tendered to demonstrate that t]:ie 
strike had been provoked by the Board's failure to meet 
teachers' demands, and petitioner's counsel asked to 
cross-examine Board members individually. The Board 
rej ected the request, but permitted counsel to make the 
offer of proof, aimed at showing that the Board's con-
tract offers were unsatisfactory, that the Board used . · 
coercive and illegal bargaining tactics, and that teachers 
in the district had been locked out by the _Board. 
On April 2 the Board voted to terminate the .employ~ 
ment of striking teachers, and advised them by letter to 
that effect. However, the same letter i1Yvited all teachers 




HORTONVILLE DIST. v. HORTONVILLE ED. ASSN. 3 
accepted the invitation and returned to work; the Board 
hired replacements to fill the remaining positions. 
Respondents then filed suit against petitioners in state 
court, alleging, among other things, that the notice and 
hearing provided them by the Board were inadequate 
to comply with due process requirements. The trial 
court sustained the Board's demurrer and granted the 
Board's motion for summary judgment on the due 
process claim. The court found that the teachers, al-
though on strike, were still employees of the Board 
under Wisconsin law and that they retained a property 
interest in their positions under this Court's decisions in 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 ( 1972), and Board 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972). The court 
concluded that the only question before the Board on 
April 1 and 2 was whether the teachers were on strike 
in violation of state law, and that no evidence in mitiga-
tion was relevant. It rejected their claim that they were 
denied due process, since the teachers admitted they were 
on strike after receiving adequate notice and a hearing, 
including the warning that they were in violation of 
Wisconsin law. 
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. 0 
Hortonville Education Assn. v. Hortonville Joint School fl 
District No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469,225 N. W. 2d 658 (1975). 
Some of the issues decided are not raised in this Court, 
including the Wisconsin Supreme Court's conclusion that 
the striking teachers had a liberty and property interest 
sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause. The single 
issue now presented is the holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution required that the teachers' conduct and the 
Board's response be evaluated by an impartial decision-
maker other than the Board. The rationale of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court appears to be that although the 
- -
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teachers had admitted being on strike, and although the 
strike violated Wisconsin law, the Board had available 
other remedies than dismissal, including an injunction 
prohibiting the strike, a call for mediation. or continued 
bargaining. Relying on our holding in Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972) , the Wisconsin court then 
held "it would seem essential, even in cases of undisputed 
or stipulated facts , that an impartial decision maker be 
charged with the responsibility of determining what 
action shall be taken on the basis of those facts." 66 
Wis. 2d, at 493. The court held that the Board was not 
sufficiently impartial to make this choice: "The back-
ground giving rise to the ultimate facts in this case re-
veals a situation not at all conductrve to detachment and ~ 
impartiality on the part of the school board." 66 Wis. 2d, 
at 493--494. In reaching its conclusion, the court ac-
knowledged that the Board's decision could be reviewed 
in other forums; but no reviewing body would give the 
teachers an opportunity to demonstrate that "another 
course of action such as mediation, injunction, continued 
collective bargaining or arbitration would have been a 
more reasonable response on the part of the decision 
maker." 66 Wis. 2d, at 496. 
Since it concluded that state law provided no adequate 
remedy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court fashioned one it 
thought necessary to comply with federal due process 
principles. To leave with the Board "[a]s much control 
as possible ... to set policy and manage the school," the 
court held that the Board should after notice and hearing 
make the decision to fire in the first instance. A teacher 
dissatisfied with the Board's decision could petition any 
court of record in the count , for a de nova hearing on all ____ R __ 
· issues; the trial court would "resolve any factual disputes 
and provide the reasonable disposition." 66 Wis. 2d, at 
498. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that this 
- -
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remedy was "not ideal because a court may b~ required 
to make public policy decisions that are better left to a 
legislative or administrative body." Ibid. But it would 
suffice "until such time and only until such time as the 
iegislature provides a means to establish a forum that 
will meet the requirements of due process." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari as to the state court's relianae 
on federal due process. 423 U. S. 821 (1975). We 
reverse. 
II 
The Hortonville School District is a common school 
district under Wisconsin law, financed by local property 
taxes and state school aid and governed by an elected 
seven-member school board. Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 120.011 
120.03, 120.06. The Board has broad power over "the 
possession, care, control and management of the property 
and affairs of the school district." Id., § 120.12 (1); see 
also §§ 120.08, 120..10 120.15-120.17. The Board negoti• 
ates terms of employment with teachers under the Wis-
consin Municipal Employment Relations Act, id., § 111.-
70 et seq., and contracts with individual teachers on be-
half of the district. The Board is the only body vested 
by statute with the power to employ and dismiss teach-
ers. Id. , § 118.22 (2).1 
The sole issue in this case is whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
school board from making the decision to dismiss teach-
ers admittedly engaged in a strike and persistently re-
fusing to return to their duties.2 The Wisconsin Su-
1 The National School Boards Association informs us that 45 States 
lodge the power to dismiss teachers in local school boards. Brief 
of National School Boards Association, amicus curiae, n. 4, at 9. 
2 This case presents no issue whether the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the teachers' interest in continued employment. The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court held that the discharge of the teachers during 
- -
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preme Court held that state law prohibited the strike 
and that termination of the striking teachers' employ-
ment was a permissible response by the Board within its 
statutory authority. 66 Wis. 2d, at 479-481., We are, 
of course, bound to accept the interpretation of Wiscon-
sin law by the highest court of the State. Groppi v. 
Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 507 (1971); Kingsley Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959). The only 
decision remaining for the Board therefore involved the 
exercise of its discretion as to what should be done to 
carry out the duties the law placed on the Board. 
A 
Respondents argue, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
. held, that the choice presented for the Board's decision 
is analogous to that involved in revocation of parole in 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), that the 
decision could be made only by an impartial decision-
maker, and that the Board was not impartial. In Mor-
their 1973-1974 individual contracts, and the revocation of the 
Board's individual offers of employment for the 1974-1975 school 
year, deprived them of property. 66 Wis. 2d, at 489. ''Property 
interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined by exist-
ing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain bene-
fits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits .... " 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972). We do not 
challenge the Wisconsin Supreme Court's conclusion that state law 
gave these teachers a "legitimate claim of entitlement to job ten-
ure." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972). 
Nor are we required to determine whether the notice and hearing 
afforded by the Board, as matters separate from the Board's ability 
fairly to decide the issue before it, were adequate to afford respond-
ents due process. Respondents do not suggest here that the notice 
they received was constitutionally inadequate, and they refused to 
treat the dismissals on a case-by-case basis. 
- -
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rissey the Court considered a challenge to state proce-
dures employed in revoking the parole of state prisoners. 
There we noted that the parole revocation decision in-
volved two steps: first an inquiry whether the parolee 
had in fact violated the conditions of his parole; second, 
determining whether violations found were serious enough 
to justify revocation of parole and the consequent depri-
vation of the parolee's conditional liberty. With respect 
to the second step, the Court observed: 
"The second question involves the application of 
expertise by the parole authority in making a pre-
diction as to the ability of the individual to live in 
society without committing antisocial acts. This 
part of the decision, too, depends on facts, and there-
fore it is important for the board to know not only 
that some violation was committed but also to know 
accurately how many and how serious the violations 
were. Yet this second step, deciding what to do 
about the violation once it is identified, is not purely 
factual but also predictive and discretionary." 408 
U. S., at 480. 
Nothing in this case is analogous to the first step in 
Morrissey, since the teachers admitted to being on strike. 
But respondents argue that the School Board's decision 
in this case is, for constitutional purposes, the same as 
the second aspect of the decision to revoke parole. The 
Board cannot make a "reasonable" decision on this issue, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held and respondents ar-
gue, because its members are biased in some fashion that 
the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibit.3 
3 Respondents argue that the requirement that the Board's decision 
be "reasonable" is in fact a requirement of state law. From that 
pi:emise and from the premise that the "reas.onableness" determina-
- -
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Morrissey arose in a materially different context. We 
recognized there that a parole violation could occur at a 
place distant from where the parole revocation decision 
would finally be made; we also recognized the risk of 
factual error, such as misidentification. To minimize 
this risk, we held "due process requires that after the 
arrest [for parole violation], the determinatiOfl that rea-
sonable ground exists for revocation of parole should be 
made by someone not directly involved in the case." 408 
U. S., at 485. But this holding must be read against our 
earlier discussion in Morrissey of the parole officer's role 
tion requires an evaluation of the Board's negotiating stance, they 
argue that nothing but decision and review de nova by an "unin-
volved" party will secure their right to a "reasonable" decision. See 
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, n. 25, at 58-59 (1975) . It is clear, 
however, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Board's 
decision must be " reasonable," not by virtue of state law, but because 
of its reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. First, the Wisconsin court relied largely upon cases inter-
preting the Federal Constitution in this aspect of its holding. See 
66 Wis. 2d, at 493. Second, the only state case the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court cited for more than a general statement of federal 
requirements was Durkin v. Board of Police & Fire Commissioners, 
48 Wis. 2d 112, 180 N. W. 2d 1 (1970). There the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court interpreted a state statute that gave firemen and 
policemen the right to appeal a decision of the Board of Police and 
Fire Commissioners to a state court; the statute expressly provided 
that the court was to determine whether "upon the evidence the 
order of the Boa.rd was reasonable." 180 N. W. 2d, at 3. See Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 62.13 (5) (1) . There is no comparable statutory provi-
sion giving teachers the right to review by this standard. Finally, to 
impose a "reasonableness" requirement, or any other test that looks 
to evaluation by another entity, makes semantic sense only where 
review is contemplated by the statute. Review, and the standard 
for review, are concepts that go hand in hand. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court concluded both that review of the Board's decision 
was necessary and that a "reasonableness" standard was appropriate 
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as counselor and confidant to the parolee; it is this same 
officer who, on the basis of preliminary information, 
decides to arrest the parolee. A school board is not to 
be equated with the parole officer as an arresting officer; 
the school board is more like the parole board, with the 
ultimate plenary authority to make its decisions derived 
from the state legislature. General language about due 
process in a holding concerning revocation of parole is not 
a reliable basis for dealing with the school board's power 
as an employer to dismiss teachers for cause. We must 
focus more clearly on first, the nature of the bias respond-
ents attribute to the Board, and second, the nature of the 
interests at stake in this case. 
B 
Respondents' argument rests in part on doctrines that 
have no application to this case. They seem to argue 
the Board members had some personal or official stake 
in the decision whether the teachers should be dismissed, 
comparable to the stake the Court saw in Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510 (1972) , or Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 
409 U. S. 57 (1972); see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 
U. S. 564 (1973) , and that the Board has manifested 
some personal bitterness toward the teachers, aroused by 
teacher criticism of the Board during the strike, see, e. g., 
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. 
Pennsylvani,a,, 400 U. S. 455 (1971). But the teachers 
did not even try to show, and the Wisconsin courts did 
not find , that the Board members had the kind of per:: 
sonal or financial stake in the decision that has some-
times been thought to create a conflict of interest, and 
there is nothing in the record to support charges of per-
sonal animosity. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was 
careful "not to suggest ... that the board members were 
anything but dedicated public servants, trying to pro-
- -
74-1606-OPINION 
10 HORTONVILLE DIST. v. HORTONVILLE ED. ASSN. 
vide the district with quality education ... within its 
limited budget." 66 Wis. 2d, at 494. That court's anal-
ysis would seem to be confirmed by the Board's repeated 
invitations for striking teachers to return to work, the 
final invitation being contained in the letter that notified 
them of their discharge:1 
The only other factor suggested to support the claim 
of bias is that the School Board was involved in the ne-
gotiations that preceded and precipitated the striking 
teachers' discharge. Participation in those negotiations 
was a statutory duty of the Board. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court held that this involvement, without more, 
. disqualified the Board from ~elinfflf11ether the teach-
ers should be dismissed : 
"The board was the collective bargaining agent for 
the school district and thus was engaged in the col-
lective bargaining process with the teachers' repre-
sentative, the HEA. It is not difficult to imagine 
the frustration on the part of the board members 
4 Respondents alleged before the Board, and argue. here, that 
the Board's decision to dismiss them was motivated by antiunion 
animus in addition to personal vindictiveness, and that their illegal 
strike should be excused because the Board provoked it. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court suggested that the Board's "decision to dis-
charge was possibly a convenient alternative which would eliminate 
their labor problems in one fell swoop ." 66 Wis . 2d, at 494. Given 
that Wisconsin statutes permitted the Board to dismiss striking 
teachers, and assuming, as did the Wisconsin court, that the Board's 
decision was in other respects proper under state labor law, we <lo 
not agree that federal due process prevented the Board from pur-
~i:.-1li 
suing a course of action that was within its explicit statutory / +~ 
authority and which, in ~~udgment, would serve the best interests ..Q..... ~ 
of the school system. That the result may also have been desirable 
for other reasons is irrelevant to the due process issue on which the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision turned, and if the other reasons 
a.re invalid under state law, respondents can resort to whatever 
forum the State provides 
- -
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when negotiations broke down, agreement could not 
be reached and the employees resorted to concerted 
activity. . . . They were ... not uninvolved in the 
events which precipitated decisions they were re-
quired to make." 66 Wis. 2d, at 493-494. 
Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an 
agency in the performance of its statutory role does not, 
however, disqualify a decisionmaker. Withrow v. Larkin, 
421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975); Federal Trade Commission v. 
Cement Institute, 33 U. S. 683, 700-703 (1948). Nor 
is a decisionmaker automatically disqualified simply be-
cause he has taken a position, even in public, on a policy 
issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a showing 
that he is not "capable of judging a particular contro-
versy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances." 
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941); see 
also FTC v. Cement Institute, supra, 701. 
Respondents' claim and the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's holding reduce to the argument that the Board 
was biased because it negotiated with the teachers on 
behalf of the school district without reaching agreement 
and learned about the reasons for the strike in the course 
of negotiating. From those premises the Wisconsin 
Court concluded that the Board somehow lost its statu-
tory power to judge that the strike and persistent re-
fusal to terminate it amounted to conduct serious 
enough to warrant discharge of the strikers. Wisconsin 
statutes vest in the Board the power to discharge its em-
ployees, a power of every employer, whether it has nego-
tiated with the employees before discharge or not. The 
Fourteenth Amendment permits a court to strip the 
Board of the otherwise unremarkable power the Wiscon~ 
sin Legislature has given it only if the Board's prior in-
volvement in negotiating with the teachers means that 
it cannot act consistent with due process. 
- -
74-1606-OPINION 
12 HORTONVILLE DIST. v. HORTONVILLE ED. ASSN. 
C 
Due process, as this Court has repeatedly held, is a 
term that "negates any concept of inflexible procedures 
universally applicable to every imaginable situation." 
Cajeterial Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,895 (1961). 
Determining what process is due in a given setting re-
quires the Court to take into -account the individual's 
stake in the decision at issue as well as the State's inter-
est in a particular procedure for __ making it. See 
Mathews v. Eldridge, -- U. S. -- (1976); Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168 (1974) (POWELL, J., con-
curring); id., at 188 (WHITE, J ., concurring and dissent-
ing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263-266 (1970). 
Our assessment of the interests of the parties in this case 
leads to the conclusion that this is a very different case 
from Morrissey v. Brewer, su'f)'f'a, and that the Board's 
prior role as negotiator does not disqualify it to decide 
that the public interest in maintaining uninterrupted 
classroom work required that teachers striking in viola-
tion of state law should be discharged. 
The teachers' interest in these proceedings is, of course, 
self-evident: they wished to avoid termination of their 
employment, obviously an important interest, but one that 
must be examined in light of several factors. Since the 
teachers admitted that they were engaged in a work 
stoppage, there was no possibility of an erroneous factual 
determination on this critical threshold issue. Moreov~r, 
what the teachers claim as a property right was the expec-
tation that the jobs they had left to go and remain on 
strike in violation of law would remain open to them. The 
Wisconsin court appears to have accepted at least the 
essence of that claim in defining the property right under 
state law, and we do not quarrel with its conclusion. But 
we note that both "the risk of an erroneous deprivation" 
and "the degree of potential deprivation" differ in both a 
- -
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qualitative sense and in degree from those in Morrissey. 
Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, -- U.S.--, at--. 
The governmental interests at stake in this case also 
differ significantly from the interests at stake in Mor-
rissey. The Board's decision whether to dismiss striking 
teachers involves broad considerations, and does not in 
the main turn on the Board's view of the "seriousness" 
of the teachers' conduct or the factors they urge miti-
gated their violation of state law. The Board had an 
obligation to make a decision based on its own answer 
to an important question of policy·: what choice among 
the alternative responses to the teachers' strike will best 
serve the interests of the school system, the interests of 
the parents and children who depend on the system, and 
the interests of the citizens whose taxes support it? The 
Board's decision was only incidentally a disciplinary 
decision; it had significant governmental and public 
policy dimensions as well. See Summers, Public Em-
ployee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 Yale L. J. 
1156 ( 1974). 
State law vests the governmental, or policymaking, 
function exclusively in the School Board and the State 
has two interests in keeping it there. First, the Board 
is the body with overall responsibility for the governance 
of the school district; it must cope with the myriad day-
to-day problems of a modern public school system includ-
ing the severe consequences of a tea.chers' strike to the 
students; by virtue of electing them the constitutents 
have declared the Board members qualifi.ed to deal with 
these problems, and they are accountable to the voters for 
the manner in which they perform. Second, the state 
legislature has given to the Board the power to employ 
and dismiss teachers, as a part of the balance it has struck 
in the area of municipal labor relations; altering those 
statutory powers as a matter of federal due process clearly 
- -
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changes that balance. Permitting the Board to make the 
decision at issue here preserves its control over school dis-
trict affairs, leaves the balance of power in labor relations 
where the state legislature struck it, and assures that the 
decision whether to dismiss the teachers will be made by 
the body responsible for that decision under state law.5 
III 
Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the de-
cision to terminate their employment was infected by 
the sort of bias that we have held to disqualify other 
decisionmakers as a matter of federal due process. A 
showing that the Board was "involved" in the events 
preceding this decis~on, in light of the important interest 
in leaving with the Board the power given by the state 
legislature, is not enough to overcome the "presump-
tion of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudi-
cators." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975). 
Accordingly, we hold that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee respondents 
that the decision to terminate their employment would 
5 Respondents argue that the School Board is free to defend its 
action in the de nova hearing authorized by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court by attempting to demonstrate that policy considerations 
dictated its decision to dismiss the striking teachers. Policymaking 
is a process of prudential judgment , and we are not prepared to 
say that a judge can genera lly make a better policy judgment or, in 
this case, as good a judgment as t he School Board, which is intimately 
familiar with all the needs of the school distri ct , or that a school 
board must, at the risk of suspending school operations, wend its 
way through judicial processes not mandated by the legislature. 
More important, no mat ter what arguments the Board may make 
to the de nova trial judge, as we noted ea rlier it will be the School 
Board that will have to 'cope with the consequences of the decision 
and be responsible to the electorate for it. The privilege of oral 
argument to a judge is no substitute for the power to employ and 
di&miss vested by statute exclusively in the Board. 
' , - -
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be made or reviewed by a body other than the School 
Board. 
The judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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